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To mēs labi zinām, ka Kants samierināja, integrēja pretrunīgos racionālistu un empīriķu uzskatus. Ja viņam gadījumā būtu bijis slinkums šo lielo domu pašam atklāt, tad viņš tās pašu pamatprincipu varēja izlasīt šeit (A.A.). And, hence, more reasonable than all the positions described seems to be the opinion of the philosopher, who holds, that the minds knowledge is partly from the interior and partly from the exterior, not only from things, separated from matter, but also even from sensible things. For when the mind is compared with sensible things, which are without the soul, it is found to stand to them in a double relation. Firstly, as act to potentiality, in so far as things that are without the soul are potentially intelligible. But the mind itself is actually intelligible; and according to this it has an active intellect, which makes things actually intelligible. Secondly, as potentiality to act, that is to say, in as much as in the mind the forms of things are determined only potentially, which exist actually outside the mind; and for this reason there is held to be in the soul the possible intellect, whose function it is to receive forms abstracted from sensible things made actually intelligible by the light of the active intellect. And this light of the active intellect in the rational soul proceeds, as from its first origin, from separated substances, especially from God. And, in this way, it is true that the mind receives knowledge from sensible things; yet, nevertheless, the soul forms in itself the likenesses of things, in so far as, by the light of the active intellect, forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible that they may be received in the possible intellect. And so also in the light of the active intellect all knowledge is, in a sense, originally inborn in us, through the medium of universal conceptions, which are immediately known by the light of the active intellect, through which, as by universal principles, we judge of other things, and in them we foreknow those things. A.A
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